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NOTES 
Deferred Compensation Arrangements Under Section 83 
of the Internal Revenue Code: Is Restricted Property 
Still a Viable Means of Compensation? 
When faced with the problem of compensating key executives, 
employers have tended to avoid the exclusive use of current cash 
compensation, since this would result in an immediate and substan-
tial income tax to highly paid employees. Deferred compensation 
plans have been utilized in order to maximize tax benefits for em-
ployees, such as deferred recognition of income and capital gains 
treatment.1 Although such plans are structured to meet the needs 
of the particular employer and employee, several forms of deferred 
compensation are common. Among these are qualified and unquali-
fied pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans; qualified, re-
stricted,2 and employee stock purchase plans (the so-called statutory 
stock options); nonstatutory stock options;3 and the transfer of re-
stricted property. This Note will be limited to an analysis of the 
new section 834 of the Internal Revenue Code, which was intended 
to eliminate the capricious variations in ta."{ consequences that have 
accompanied the transfer of restricted property as compensation for 
over twenty-five years.5 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969,6 the rules respecting the 
receipt of restricted property were contained in the Treasury Regu-
lations relating to the law of nonstatutory stock options;7 the Code 
itself was silent on the point. The establishment of these rules was, 
in part, a response to the Tax Court's decision in Robert Lehman.8 
In that case petitioner was a partner in the firm of Lehman Broth-
ers, which had received stock options that it exercised in February 
1943. The parties agreed that the acquisition of the shares did not 
give rise to any income in 1943 because they had no ascertainable 
1. See generally Buchhelder, Executive Compensation After the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969, 48 TAXES 652 (1970); Kelsey &: Buckheit, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1969 on Executive Compensation, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 246 (1970). 
2. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 424(b) limits the availability of restricted stock options 
to plans or contracts adopted before January 1, 1964. 
3. A "nonstatutory stock option" is an option which does not meet the statutory 
requirements' of § 42l(a), INT. REv. CODE OF 1954. 
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83, added by Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-172, § 32l(a), 83 Stat. 487. 
5. See HOUSE CO!',IM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 1ST Sl:SS., TAX REFORM 
PROPOSALS 60 (Comm. Print. 1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
E.S. Cohen). 
6. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
7. Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(d)(5), l.421-6(d)(2) (1966). 
8. 17 T.C. 652 (1951). Cf. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner 
v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). 
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fair market value as a result of restrictions upon their sale.9 The 
restrictions terminated on December 31, 1943. In February and 
March 1944, the firm sold the stock and reported the excess of the 
amount realized over cost as a long-term capital gain. Lehman re-
ported his share of the gain as a partner of the firm. The Commis-
sioner contended that the firm realized ordinary income at the time 
the restrictions lapsed to the extent that the fair market value of 
the shares at the time the restrictions lapsed exceeded their cost. 
The court held that the termination of the restrictions was not a 
taxable event10 since there was no "sale or other disposition" of the 
stock under the predecessor of section 1001.11 Furthermore, the 
entire gain upon sale of the stock was properly reported as long-
term capital gain.12 Thus the holding in Lehman favored the tax-
payer both as to timing of income recognition and the type of 
income recognized.13 
The Commissioner's initial acquiescence in Lehman was with-
drawn14 after the promulgation of the regulations to section 421.15 
Reflecting the Commissioner's objections to Lehman, the regulations 
provided that the lapse of the restrictions would be a taxable event 
producing ordinary income and that the later sale would be entitled 
to capital gains treatment.16 In general, under the regulations, an 
individual who received property subject to restrictions having a 
significant effect on the property's value, whether he received the 
property as the result of a stock option17 or as a direct payment from 
the employer,18 was deemed to have realized ordinary income at 
the time the restrictions lapsed. The amount of income was the 
lower of the value of the property at the time he received it, com-
puted as if the restrictions did not exist, or the value at the time the 
restrictions lapsed, in either case reduced by the amount the em-
9. 17 T.C. at 653. The Tax Court did not discuss the nature of the restrictions, 
and the only information given was that they lasted from February 1, 1943, to Decem-
ber 31, 1943. 17 T.C. at 653. 
10. 17 T.C. at 654. 
11. Int, Rev. Code of 1939, § 111. Conceptually, the court's view of the termination 
of restrictions seems analogous to the tax treatment of property on which a zoning 
restriction is removed. While there may be an immediate and substantial increase in 
the value of the property, there is no taxable event until sale or other disposition. 
12. 17 T.C. at 654. 
13. Compare Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acquiesced in 1952-2 CUM. 
BULL. 2 (restricted stock acquired had no ascertainable fair market value, so no income 
to petitioner; issue of taxability upon lapse of restrictions not reached). 
14. 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 7, withdrawing acquiescence in 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3 and 
substituting nonacquiescence. 
15. T .D. 6416, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 126. 
16. See Treas. Reg. §§ l.61-2(d)(5), l.421-6(d) (1966). 
17. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2) (1966). 
18. Treas. § l.61-2(d)(5) (1966). This provision applied generally to restricted prop-
erty given in compensation, incorporating by reference the regulations under § 421 
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ployee had paid for the property.19 This rule, by allowing date 
of receipt to set a ceiling on ordinary income, tended to maximize 
the capital gain element of restricted property. 
To remedy this preferential tax treatment, and as part of a con-
tinuing effort to attain uniform treatment of property transferred 
in connection ·with the performance of services,20 the Treasury 
Department in 1968 issued proposed regulations21 which would 
have caused the recipient to include in gross income the excess of 
the fair market value over the cost on the date the restrictions 
lapsed, without any reference to the possible lower value when the 
property was received. The regulations were never promulgated22 
because the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in essence codified these 
proposed regulations in section 83 of the Code. 
The genesis of the title of the new section is indicative of its 
fundamental purpose. Originally labeled "Restricted Property" in 
the House bill,23 it was changed in the Senate bill to "Property 
Transferred in Connection with Performance of Services."24 Al-
though the provision is aimed at restricted property, it is drafted 
to provide, for the first time, an express Code section for compen-
sation paid in kind, irrespective of any restrictions, and irrespective 
of whether received under a stock option, deferred compensation, 
or some alternative arrangement. 
I. TAX EFFECT UPON THE EMPLOYEE 
Under section 83(a), a person who receives property either di-
rectly or through a beneficiary25 in connection with the performance 
of services must include an amount in gross income when the rights 
of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are 
transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, 
whichever comes earlier. Although the conditions for inclusion in 
income are ·written in the alternative, the statute expressly provides 
that property rights are "transferable" only if the rights of the 
dealing with stock options. Future citations concerning previous law will be to the latter 
provisions alone. 
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966). 
20. This attempt to achieve unified treatment is indicated by the Treasury Depart• 
ment's issuance of proposed regulations and amendments to regulations under INT, 
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 83, 162, 402(b), 403(c)-(d), 404(a)(5), 421, '721. See Proposed 
Treas. Reg., 33 Fed. Reg. 158'70 (1968), as corrected by 34 Fed, Reg, 39'7 (1969), witll-
drawn, 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971). 
21. Proposed Treas. Reg. § I.421-6(d), 33 Fed. Reg. 15870 (1968), 
22. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10787 (1971). 
23. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1969) (House Ways and Means Comm, 
version). 
24. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 321 (1969) (Senate Finance Comm. version), 
25. See text accompanying notes 54-55 infra. 
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transferee in such property are not subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture.26 The statute further defines "substantial risk of for£ei-
ture" as a conditioning of the rights of full enjoyment of property 
upon future per£ormance of substantial services by any individual.27 
These definitional limitations diminish the independent signifi-
cance of the term "transferability." Nevertheless, some independent 
significance remains. If property was given to an employee in a 
manner that would enable him to transfer it to a bona fide purchaser 
free of restriction to the transferee, then the tax arises the moment 
the employee receives the property, even though the property in 
the employee's hands is subject to a substantial risk of for£eiture.28 
However, if the restriction imposes upon the transferee a substan-
tial risk of for£eiture conditioned upon the employee's continued 
services, then no tax would arise until the risk of forfeiture is lifted 
from either the employee or the transferee. 
If a recipient disposes of property before "for£eitable" restric-
tions lapse in an arm's length transaction, realization will occur at 
the time of disposition.29 In the case of a transfer of restricted prop-
erty which is not at arm's length, the proposed regulations to section 
83 indicate the probable tax treatment of this transaction.30 The 
example given is employee X, pursuant to an option, purchasing 
restricted stock for $50, the fair market value in 1971 being $100. 
Later in the year, he sells the stock to his ·wife for $10. When the 
restrictions lapse in 1972, the fair market value of the stock is $120. 
X would recognize taxable gross income of $10 in 1971. In 1972, 
he recognizes taxable gross income of $60. This is computed by 
taking the fair market value ($120) less the amount paid ($50), less 
the amount already taxed ($10). In this case, the wife would still 
be subject to the restrictions on the property at the time of transfer, 
so this result is consistent with the definition of transferability in 
section 83(c)(2). If this transfer to the wife was a gift, X would not 
recognize any income in 1971, and would recognize $70 in 1972 
when the restrictions lapsed ($120 fair market value less the $50 
paid for the stock). 
The amount included in gross income is the fair market value 
at the date such property must be included in gross income less any 
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(c)(2). 
27. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(c)(l). 
28. The Senate Report states that 
an interest in property is to be considered to be transferable only if a transferee 
would not be subject to forfeitability conditions-for example, where the employee 
has a forfeitable interest in stock, but the fact of forfeitability is not indicated on 
the stock. certificate, and a transferee would have no notice of it. 
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 119, 122 (1969). 
29. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a). 
30. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-l(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789 (1971). 
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amount paid for the property.31 "Fair market value" is determined 
without regard to the effect of any restrictions with the single excep-
tion that the effect of a restriction "which by its terms will never 
lapse" will be taken into account.32 The reason for this exception is 
that Congress felt that this type of restriction was not tax-motivated 
and should be distinguished from restrictions designed to achieve 
deferral for tax-saving purposes.33 
From the employee's perspective, the new provision is not as 
favorable as the rules under prior law. Under prior law the matter 
was dealt with in the regulations under sections 6l(a)(l) and 421. 
These regulations provided that if property was transferred as com• 
pensation for services, and if the property was subject to a restriction 
which had a significant effect on value, nothing was included in 
income upon receipt of the property. If the employee continued to 
hold the property, realization was deferred until the restriction 
lapsed. The amount included at that time was the lesser of the fair 
market value of the property at the time of transfer without regard 
to the restriction, or the fair market value at the time of the lapse 
of the restriction, less the amount paid for the property.34 
Revenue Ruling 68-8635 and the pre-section 83 case of Ira Hirsch30 
made it clear that even a temporary restriction preventing sale or 
other disposition could be considered to have a significant effect on 
value. As a result there was an increase in the number of restricted 
stock plans under the previous regulations. These plans were attrac-
tive as an employee benefit because they permitted the employee 
to obtain the status of an investor, entitled to capital gain treatment 
on future appreciation beginning at the time of the transfer of the 
stock, and, in addition, permitted deferred recognition of income 
until he was free to sell the stock. 
In contrast, although restrictions against sale had a significant 
effect on value under prior law, they would not be considered 
forfeitable under section 83(c)(l) of the Code since no future ser-
vices are required as a condition of ownership. Deferral of recognition 
requires both restrictions on transferability and risk of forfeiture.37 
The new statute narrows the circumstances under which deferred 
recognition of compensation income will be permitted. In addition, 
when recognition is deferred, capital gains treatment for appreciation 
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83(a). 
32. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 83(a}(l). See also S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, 
at 121. 
33. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 86, 88 (1969); S. REP. No. 
91-552, supra note 28, at 121. 
34. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2) (1966). 
35. 1968-1 CUM. Buu.. 184. 
36. 51 T.C. 121 (1968). 
37. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(a). 
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between the time of transfer of property and the lapse of restriction 
is eliminated. 
As indicated by the Ways and Means Committee report, the 
purpose of section 83 ·was to eliminate the "more generous" tax 
treatment afforded the transfer of restricted property.38 Congress 
sought to channel the transfer of restricted property into previously 
recognized statutory patterns applicable to other forms of noncash 
compensation. When property is transferred subject to restrictions 
of a nonforfeitable type, the proper analogy was thought to be a 
nonforfeitable contribution to an individual's account in a non-
qualified employees' pension or profit-sharing trust.89 Under section 
402(b), the employee would immediately be taxed on such contri-
bution at ordinary income rates even though the funds might be 
beyond his reach for years. As to forfeitable stock, the proper 
analogy was thought to be deferred compensation arrangements. 
One example of this would be phantom stock plans under which 
the employee would defer income until his rights vested, at which 
time he would receive payment. At that time, when he had received 
the deferred compensation and it was no longer subject to forfeiture, 
the employee would be taxed on the property's full value and it 
would be included in gross income and taxed at the ordinary income 
rates.40 The new rules reflect these analogies. 
The Senate Finance Committee added section 83(b), which allows 
recipients of restricted property to elect, within thirty days from 
date of transfer, to treat it as compensation in the year it is received, 
even though it is not transferable and is subject to a substantial 
risk of forfeiture.41 In this manner an employee may qualify future 
appreciation as capital gain, rather than ordinary income, even 
while the property is forfeitable. 
This potential tax benefit is not without risk. Section 83(b) pro-
vides that if an election is made and the property is subsequently 
forfeited, then "no deduction shall be allowed in respect of such 
forfeiture."42 It has been noted that the literal language of the pro-
vision could be read to preclude a deduction not only in regard to 
amounts included in income but also in regard to any amount actu-
ally paid for the property (for example, if the property was pur-
chased under a favorable option).48 The proposed regulations to 
section 83 preclude this unfair result, providing expressly that a 
forfeiture shall be treated as a disposition, upon which loss is recog-
38. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 supra note 33, pt. 1, at 86. 
39. See id. at 86-88. 
40. See Treas. Reg. § l.61·2(d)(5) (1966); Buchhelder, supra note 1, at 673-74. 
41. See S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 123. 
42. INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(b){l). 
43. See Kelsey 8: Buckheit, supra note 1, at 261. 
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nized equal to the excess of the amount paid for the property over 
any amount realized upon forfeiture.44 Another risk is that the fair 
market value of the property will decline after the election under 
section 83(b). The proposed regulations deal with the problem of 
trying to recoup some of this loss through the less favorable method 
of a capital loss. The basis of the property when the sale comes after 
the restrictions have lapsed is the amount actually paid for the prop-
erty and the amount included under section 83(b). If the sale is 
before any restriction has lapsed and there is a loss, the basis is only 
the amount actually paid.45 The apparent justification for this rather 
unusual distinction is the preservation of the integrity of the provi-
sion prohibiting a loss deduction in the event of a forfeiture. Thus 
a recipient cannot sell his property and take a large capital loss 
shortly before he would have forfeited the stock. The more funda-
mental question is why eliminate the loss deduction at all since the 
recipient has reported the property as compensation. Evidently the 
provision reflects congressional sentiment that the right to take such 
an election and with it the prospect of larger long-term capital gain 
upon sale should be accompanied by some risk of nondeductible loss. 
Whether this belief is founded in some rational policy is unclear. 
Finally, section 83(£) prescribes the holding period for property 
to which subsection (a) applies. The holding period begins when the 
taxpayer's rights in the property are either transferable or are not 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. In contrast, under previous 
law the holding period began at the time of transfer of the property 
to the employee.46 
II. TAX TREATMENT OF THE EMPLOYER 
The tax treatment of the party who pays compensation in prop-
erty is governed by section 83(h), which provides that "there shall be 
allowed as a deduction under section 162" the amount included in 
the gross income of the person who performs the services. But under 
this section that party is allowed the deduction only when the person 
performing the services includes the amount in his income. Thus 
deduction under section 162 is delayed until the risk of forfeiture 
is lifted or the interest in the property is transferable. 
One commentator has suggested that the statute's express provi-
sion that a deduction "shall be allowed" under section 162 in the 
amount included in the income of the taxpayer appears to make the 
44. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789-90 (1971). 
45. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10789-90 (1971). 
46. See Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(2)(i) (1966). This regulation dates the holding pe-
riod from the time of exercise of the option. Since the employee was taxed on the 
lesser of the fair market value at the time of exercise or at the time the restrictions 
lapsed, the differential was eligible for capital gain treatment in any subsequent sale 
of the property. Section 83 now eliminates this possibility. 
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usual "reasonable allowance" limitation of section 162(a)(l) inap-
plicable.47 But despite the statute's literal language, a more likely 
interpretation is that the employer must fulfill all requirements of 
section 162, including the "reasonable allowance" limitation, in 
order to obtain a deduction under section 83(h). The legislative 
history suggests an intention only to eliminate preferential tax treat-
ment regarding the transfer of restricted property,48 and an inter-
pretation of section 83(h) which would expand the established 
limitations on permissible trade or business expense deductions 
under section 162 appears unfounded. 
This conclusion that all the requirements of section 162 must 
be met takes on greater significance in light of a recent revenue 
ruling49 disallowing a deduction under section 162. The Internal 
Revenue Service contended that a willful payment of salaries in ex-
cess of the maximums set by the wage-price control guidelines cannot 
be deducted because such payment is punishable by fine and thus a 
deduction would contravene section 162(c)(2).50 Assuming that this 
ruling will be upheld by the courts, a holding that section 83(h) 
must be read literally would mean that an employer could circum-
vent the ruling's limitations simply by compensating his employees 
·with property rather than with cash. This possibility alone should 
be enough to cause courts to require that all requirements of section 
162 be met before a deduction will be allowed. 
The new rules improve the after-tax impact of restricted stock 
plans for employers by accelerating the deduction in the case of 
nonforfeitable restrictions, and by increasing the amount of deduc-
tion in the case of forfeitable restrictions. This is because under 
prior law, the deduction allowed the employer in the case of for-
feitable restrictions was the lesser of the fair market value of the 
property, without regard to the restriction, at the time of transfer 
or the fair market value at the time the restrictions lapsed. 51 Under 
present law the employer will benefit from any appreciation in value 
through an increased deduction. If the property declines in value 
he will receive the same deduction that he would have under previ-
ous law. In the case of nonforfeitable restrictions, since present law 
taxes these at the time of transfer the employer ·will receive his 
deduction then. Previously he had to wait until the nonforfeitable 
47. D. HERWI'IZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 149 (Supp. 1971). 
48. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, supra note 33, pt. 1, at 86-87; S. REP. No. 91-552, 
supra note 28, 120-21. 
49. Rev. Rul. 72-236, 1972 INT. REv. Buu.. No. 20, at 7. 
50. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162(c)(2), as amended by Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 
No. 92-178, § 310(a), 85 Stat. 497, provides: "No deduction shall be allowed ••• for 
any payment ••• made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes 
••• [an] illegal payment under any law of the United States ••• which subjects the 
payor to a criminal penalty •••• " 
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(£) (1966). 
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restrictions lapsed if the nonforfeitable restriction was deemed to 
have a significant effect on value. With respect to forfeitable stock, 
section 83(h) allows the employer to deduct full value, including 
any appreciation, when the restrictions lapse. 
Despite these accelerated deduction benefits to employers, the 
new rules may not operate to their benefit. Assuming that employees 
are ultimately concerned with after-tax income, and in light of the 
fact that section 83 is less favorable to the employees than prior law, 
employers may be forced to provide a greater magnitude of benefits 
to their executives in order to give an after-tax income equivalent 
to that obtainable under prior law. Increased compensation costs to 
the employer may more than offset benefits from the new rules 
relating to deductions. 
III. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 83 AND SOME PROBLEMS 
UNDER THE NEW RULES 
A. If in Connection with the Performance of Services 
Section 83(a) states that income results to the person who per-
forms the services when property is transferred "in connection with" 
services rather than when property is transferred "as compensation 
for" services. This language includes within its coverage property 
transferred to an independent contractor. Surely it is not intended 
to override the standards for a gift e..xclusion under section 102 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein.G2 
If the transferor's intention is essentially donative, proceeding from 
a "detached and disinterested generosity,"G3 then income should be 
excluded under section 102 even though literally it may have been 
transferred "in connection with the performance of services." 
B. Transfer to a Person Other Than the One Who 
Performs the Services 
Section 83(a) provides that if property is transferred to any 
person ( except the person for whom the services were performed) 
and the requirements of section 83 are met, income will result to 
the person who performed the services. This preserves the assign-
ment-of-income principles of Lucas v. Earl.G4 The employee will 
be taxed if the employer transfers property to a third party in recog-
nition of the employee's services.55 
52. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). 
53. 363 U.S. at 285, quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), 
54. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
55. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(£), 36 Fed. Reg. 10791 (1971). 
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C. The Fair Market Value of Such Property 
One prerequisite to determining an amount to be included in 
gross income under section 83(a) is to ascertain the fair market value 
of the property without regard to any restrictions except those which 
by their terms will never lapse. The Internal Revenue Service has 
generally contended that property received for services lacks an as-
certainable fair market value only in "rare and extraordinary 
cases."66 Options, however, are often almost impossible to value. 
For this reason, section 83(e)(3) expressly provides that the new rules 
shall not apply to the transfer of an option ·without a "readily 
ascertainable fair market value." The proposed regulations state 
that the value of an option is ordinarily not readily ascertainable 
unless the option is actively traded on an established market. 57 
One final valuation matter is that section 83(d)(l) provides that 
if a "no lapse" restriction allows the transferee to sell the property 
only at a price determined under a formula, the formula price shall 
be deemed to be the fair market value of the property, unless the 
Service establishes otherwise, with the burden of proof on the Ser-
vice. Congress felt that such a restriction is an inherent limitation 
on the recipient's property rights, and that his income should be 
determined accordingly. 58 
D. Determined Without Regard to Any Restrictions 
The computation of fair market value without regard to restric-
tions raises the question whether income can be measured for taxa-
tion in an amount greater than the actmtl present fair market value 
of the property received. Eisner v. Macomber59 established the prin-
ciple that Congress may only impose tax upon realized "income" 
under the sixteenth amendment. Under the definition of income 
set forth in Macomber, and assuming that even nonforfeitable re-
strictions decrease the value of property received, it is arguable that 
gain has not been "derived" on the total market value without 
respect to restrictions. 60 
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the Macomber 
definition of income "was not meant to provide a touchstone to all 
future gross income questions."61 It is unlikely, therefore, that a 
court would find the section in violation of the realization doctrine 
56. Treas. Reg. § l.lO0l(a) (1957); Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 CUM. Buu.. 15. 
57. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 10793 (1971). 
58. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121. 
59. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See also Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916). 
60. See 252 U.S. at 207. 
61. Commissioner v. Glensbaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1955). 
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in light of the policies underlying section 83. In an attempt to force 
all deferred compensation arrangements through statutorily ap-
proved, nondiscriminatory plans, Congress has removed the tax 
advantages allowed previously in the nonstatutory methods. Under 
sections 421-25, Congress has set out the requirements for nondis-
criminatory plans which receive favorable tax treatment. While 
Congress has not completely forbidden the use of discriminatory 
restricted stock plans, it has made the policy judgment that deferred 
tax treatment will not be allowed when the property is not subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is transferable. Even in the 
case of property subject to forfeiture and nontransferable, Congress 
took away a portion of the former advantages of these plans by tax-
ing the entire amount as ordinary income rather than allowing 
capital gains treatment from the date of exercise.62 This is consistent 
·with other areas of tax law in which discriminatory plans are al-
lowed. 63 Congress has tried to ensure equal tax treatment of all 
deferred compensation arrangements, and since these tax policies 
have not been assailed as unconstitutional in other contexts, it is 
unlikely that such an assault on section 83 would be upheld. More-
over, when there are two possible constructions, only one of which 
would render the statute unconstitutional, the construction sustain-
ing the constitutionality will prevail.64 I£ faced with a case where the 
doctrine of realization appears to be contravened, the courts could 
construe the substantial risk of forfeiture test of section 83(c)(l) to 
encompass the challenged restriction, thereby deferring taxation 
within the purview of the statutory scheme and rendering the issue 
of realization moot. 
E. Substantial Risk of Forfeiture 
Section 83(c)(l) provides that the rights of a person are subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture "if such person's rights to full 
enjoyment of such property are conditioned upon the performance 
of substantial services by an individual." This, according to the 
Senate Finance Committee, was not intended as an exclusive defini-
tion.65 A Finance Committee press release indicated that the substan-
62. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 83(a). 
63. A primary example is the tax treatment given nonqualified pension, profit. 
sharing, and stock bonus plans. If the contribution to such a plan is vested, the em-
ployee will include in his ordinary income the contributions of the employer, even 
though he may have to wait forty years or more until he receives the property. INT. 
R.Ev. ConE OF 1954, § 402(b). However, if the contribution is forfeitable when made, 
even though it later becomes nonforfeitable, the employee will not pay any tax until 
actual distributions are made. See Treas. Reg. § l.402(b)·l(a) (1956). 
64. See United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 303 (1914); Stratton's Independence, 
Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913). 
65. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121. 
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tial risk of forfeiture exists only if the employer can compel the 
employee, or other holder, to return the identical property.66 
There is certainly a gray area in which it is difficult to determine 
whether a restriction involves a "substantial risk of forfeiture." For 
example, what is meant by "performance of substantial services by an 
individual"? Is continued employment for six months substantial? 
Two years? Five years? There may also be a problem whether the 
event which causes the return of the restricted property amounts to 
a "forfeiture." For example, is a requirement that the employee re-
turn the property in exchange for the fair market value at the time 
of return a forfeiture? A proposed regulation lists some of the cir-
cumstances that may be taken into account in determining whether 
property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture: employee's age, 
availability of alternative employment opportunities, likelihood of 
obtaining other employment, employee's degree of skill, employee's 
health, and the practice of the employer.67 
Advance rulings will not be available for employers to determine 
whether planned restrictions constitute a "substantial risk of forfei-
ture. "68 The vagueness of the standard is not necessarily a defect in 
drafting, as Congress may have intended the provision to have an 
in terrorem effect in order to discourage the transfer of restricted 
property. 
F. Restrictions Which Will Never Lapse 
The no-lapse rule of section 83(d)(l) was probably intended to 
deal with the type of restriction often found in closely-held corpora-
tions requiring sale at a formula price when the shareholder leaves 
the employ of the corporation, retires, or dies. A restriction which 
never lapses is defined in the proposed regulations as 
(I) A limitation on the subsequent transfer of proper-ty transferred 
in connection with the performance of services, 
(2) Which allows the transferee of the property to sell such property 
at a price determined under a formula, and 
(3) Which ·will continue to apply to, and to be enforced against any 
subsequent holder (other than the transferor).69 
A requirement resulting in substantial risk of forfeiture, however, 
will not be considered to result in a no-lapse restriction.70 It can be 
66. SENATE Cor.n,r. ON FINANCE, 9lsr CoNG., lsr SESS., TAX REFORM Am: OF 1969; 
COMPILATION OF DECISIONS REACHED IN ExEcUTIVE SESSION 17 (Comm. Print 1969) (Press 
Release, Oct. 14, 1969). 
67. Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.83-3(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 10790 (1971). 
68. Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969-1 Cm.r. BULL. 396. 
69. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5, 36 Fed. Reg. 10792 (1971). 
70. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-5, 36 Fed. Reg. 10792 (1971). 
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expected that troublesome issues will arise in drawing the line be-
tween forfeitable restrictions and restrictions which never lapse.71 
Section 83(d)(2) provides for realization of income when a re-
striction which never lapses is cancelled. If cancellation occurs, the 
employee ·will be taxed on the element of compensation which es-
caped taxation under ordinary income rates when the property was 
originally transferred. This rule does not apply if the employee can 
establish that the cancellation was not compensatory and that the 
person who would be entitled to a deduction if it were compensatory 
will not treat the transaction as compensatory. 
If the property is subject to both a substantial risk of forfeiture 
and a restriction which never lapses and the cancellation of the latter 
occurs before the substantial risk of forfeiture lapses, an interpretive 
problem arises under section 83(d)(2). The provision is not limited 
expressly to a situation where only a restriction which never lapses 
exists prior to cancellation. The amount determined as compensa-
tion is the excess of the fair market value (computed without regard 
to "the restrictions") at the time of cancellation, over the fair market 
value immediately prior to cancellation (computed by taking "the 
restriction" into account) and the amount, if any, paid for cancella-
tion. If "the restrictions" includes even forfeitable restrictions, then 
83(d)(2) might seem to impose a tax, notwithstanding the continuing 
existence of a substantial risk of forfeiture. Such a result seems con-
trary to the thrust of section 83(a) and the congressional intention 
to defer compensation where a substantial risk of forfeiture exists. 
Thus 83(d)(2) might well be construed to be inapplicable so long as 
a substantial risk of forfeiture remains. 
It has been suggested that a tax advantage might be obtained 
71. Compare S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121: "a requirement that an 
employee sell his stock back to his employer at book value or some other reasonable 
price if he terminates his employment" is an example of a restriction that never 
lapses, with INT. REv. Co»E OF 1954, § 83(c)(l): "The rights of a person in property 
are subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture if such person's rights to full enjoyment 
of such property are conditioned upon the future performance of substantial services 
by any individual." 
One commentator has noted: 
Perhaps the critical point in the Senate Report is the reference to a "reasonable 
price," so that forfeitability would depend upon how far from market value the 
resale price was. But unless there is some significant difference bet'lveen the resale 
price and market value, the resale requirement is hardly a restriction worth taking 
into account at all; indeed, the pre-1969 regulations specifically stated that a re• 
striction requiring resale of stock to the employer at fair market value was not a 
restriction having a significant effect on value. On the other hand, if forfeitability 
is to turn on how large the difference between the resale price and fair market 
value is, a very troublesome uncertainty would be introduced into a statutory 
pattern that was supposed to bring a high degree of predictability. 
D. HER.WITZ, supra note 47, at 146. 
It has also been suggested that the example given in the Senate Report may allow 
some element of compensation income to escape inclusion in ordinary income if tltc 
resale condition becomes operative only by voluntary termination of employment and 
not by death or normal retirement. Id. at 146-47. 
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through the transfer of property subject to a no-lapse restriction in 
anticipation of sharp appreciation, perhaps by virtue of a foreseeable 
public offering.72 Since no-lapse restrictions are taken into account 
in determining the measure of compensation income at time of trans-
fer, the employee might be given substantial opportunity for capital 
gain while holding ordinary income to a minimum. A difficulty in 
this approach is that Congress excepted no-lapse restrictions from the 
general rule that restrictions are not considered in determining the 
value of nonforfeitable property because no-lapse restrictions were 
considered "not tax-motivated."73 Thus, despite the literal language 
of the statute, it could be argued that an obviously tax-motivated 
72. [T]here may still be some advantages in arrangements involving restrictions 
which never lapse ••• particularly in situations where stock is expected to appreciate 
sharply, perhaps by virtue of a foreseeable public offering or the like, and the pur-
pose of the arrangement is to make it possible for an employee to acquire substan-
tially more stock than he could afford even at the current value. Suppose, for exam-
ple, a corporation has 50,000 shares outstanding, with a current value of $10 per 
share, and because of prospects that the stock might be worth as much as $30 per 
share in the not too distant future the corporation wishes to make 5000 shares avail-
able to a key employee who has only limited outside resources. The shares might be 
issued to the employee subject to a perpetual restriction that prior to any sale or 
transfer of the shares the employee must offer them to the corporation at, say, $8 
less than the current fair market value. Assuming that this does not constitute 
forfeitability ••• the stock would be included in the employee's income upon re-
ceipt; but since the stock is subject to a restriction which never lapses, the restric-
tion would be taken into account in valuing the stock at the time of receipt. 
Whether this restriction would reduce the current fair value of this stock all the 
way down to $2 per share is not clear. Under § 83(d)(l) a perpetual restriction 
"which allows the transferee to sell such property only at a price determined under 
a formula" fixes the fair value at that price, unless the Government can sustain 
the burden of proving the contrary. Assuming that pegging the price at $8 less 
than fair market value represents a "formula", does a right of first refusal in the 
corporation constitute a restriction "which allows the transferee to sell such prop-
erty only at" the formula price? Theoretically, the answer would seem to be "no", 
since if the corporation does not exercise its right of first refusal the employee 
would be free to sell to others at full value. But as a practical matter the corpora-
tion is virtually certain to take advantage of such a bargain price (absent some 
legal restriction on the repurchase of stock). Moreover, this would seem to be the 
type of restriction contemplated by § 83(d)(l); indeed, one that literally conformed 
to the words of that provision and flatly prevented the employee in perpetuity 
from selling to anyone except at a formula price below market value would leave 
the employee in a position to decide whom he wished to favor with this bargain 
purchase, which would in and of itself be an indirect form of value to the em-
ployee. In any event, even if a right of first refusal does not fix the value of the 
stock under § 83(d)(l), it would be likely to reduce the value to a figure close 
to the formula price; though the recipient of the stock is not required to sell 
and can therefore enjoy the full value of the other elements of the stock, the fact 
remains that at least in the case of a minority interest in a publicly-held stock, 
the price at which the stock can be sold is the dominant factor in valuation. As-
summg a $2 value for the stock when received, and assuming further that the 
stock was issued for only nominal consideration, the employee would have to pay 
ta." on compensation income of only approximately $10,000 as the price of being 
able to reap the rewards of appreciation at capital gains rates on 5,000 shares; with-
out the restriction the same tax bite would be incurred upon the receipt of a 
mere 1000 shares. 
D. HERwrrz, supra note 47, at 147-48. 
Additional benefits from the use of no-lapse restrictions may arise from the usual 
power of the corporation to cancel the restrictions, if carefnl timing is exercised. See 
id. at 148. 
73. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 121. 
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no-lapse restriction should not be held to be a "restriction which will 
never lapse:• for purposes of section 83. On the other hand, Congress 
arguably made a judgment regarding no-lapse restrictions as a class, 
and thus case-by-case inquiry into motive may be unwarranted. 
G. Nonexempt Trusts and Nonqualified Annuities 
Under prior law, if an employer contributed an amount to a non-
qualified employee trust or annuity, and the employee's rights were 
nonforfeitable, the employee was required to include the full amount 
of the contribution in income at the time it was made.74 If the em-
ployee's rights were forfeitable, the employee was not taxed until 
he received actual payment.75 The employer was allowed a deduc-
tion for nonforfeitable contributions made in the year paid.70 
Under section 402(b) and section 403(c) and (d), if a previously 
forfeitable contribution became vested, the employee was not ta.xed 
until he actually received payment.77 In this case, and in the case 
where the contribution was forfeitable, the employer would not 
receive any deduction.78 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 placed the tax treatment upon 
expiration of the forfeitable restriction under section 83 so that the 
employee will be taxed when the contribution becomes nonforfeit-
able.79 The Finance Committee report indicates that this will end 
the Service's contention that the employer is not entitled to a deduc-
tion when the contribution becomes nonforfeitable, even though this 
meant that he would never receive a deduction.80 The employer is 
now permitted to take a deduction in the ta.xable year in which the 
employee includes the compensation in his gross income.81 
H. Transactions to Which the New Rules Are Not Applicable 
Section 83(d)(l) provides that the new rules are not applicable to 
a transaction to which the qualified stock option provision, section 
421, applies. Section 421 contains the rules governing qualified stock 
options, employee stock purchase plans, and restricted stock options, 
and sets stringent requirements to qualify for favorable tax treat-
ment. Except for a case in which the option price is less than the 
fair market value of the stock, no ordinary income is realized at the 
time of either grant or exercise, and the employer is not entitled to 
74. Treas. Reg. §§ I.402(b)-l(a), l.403(c)-l(a), l.403(d)-l(a)-(b) (1964). 
75. See authorities cited in note 74 supra. 
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-l(c) (1964). 
77. Treas. Reg. §§ l.402(b)-l(a), l.403(c)-l(a), l.403(d)-l(a)-(b) (1964). 
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1964). 
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 402(b). 
80. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 28, at 123. 
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83(h). 
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a deduction under section 162.82 When the stock is disposed of, the 
employee will be entitled to capital gain treatment on the apprecia-
tion of the stock between the time of exercise and the time of sale.83 
Section 83(e)(2) states that the new rules are not applicable to a 
trust under a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan 
described in section 401(a), or a transfer under an annuity plan 
which meets the requirements of section 404(a)(2). 
As noted above, section 83(e)(3) makes the section inapplicable 
to the transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable fair mar-
ket value.84 Section 83(e)(4) provides that the section shall not apply 
to the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise of an option with 
a readily ascertainable fair market value at date of· grant. The pur-
pose of these complementary provisions is to ensure that the com-
pensation element of property or options transferred will be taxed 
at ordinary income rates at one time only.85 
I. Tax Free Exchanges 
Section 83(g) covers the treatment of property received in certain 
tax free exchanges for restricted property to which the general re-
stricted property rule applies. When the property received is subject 
to restrictions and conditions substantially similar to those to which 
the property given up was subject, the exchange is to be disre-
garded for purposes of section 83(a). The property to be received 
in effect replaces the traded property as restricted property in the 
hands of the recipient subject to the provisions of se~tion 83. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 83 will, to a large extent, accomplish its primary pur-
pose of making the tax consequences uniform in cases of deferred 
compensation, regardless of the form of the arrangement. In so doing, 
however, Congress has severely diminished the ability of closely held 
corporations to attract and keep management talent. The qualified 
stock option plans are not attractive, as they are limited to indi-
82. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 42l(a), 422(c)(l). 
83. Treas. Reg. § l.421·5(a)(4) (1961). The examples indicate that an employee must 
hold the property for two years in order to qualify for the favorable tax treatment. 
84. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra. 
85. If there is a transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable value, the 
option will be taxed at exercise, if the property acquired upon exercise is not subject 
to a substantial risk of forfeiture or is transferable. Treas. Reg. § l.421-6(d)(l) (1966). 
If the property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture and is not transferable at 
the time of exercise, section 83 will apply, and the person exercising the options will 
not be taxed until the restrictions lapse. If the option has a readily ascertainable fair 
market value, the recipient will include the excess of the value over cost in ordinary 
income at the time the option is granted. Subsequent acquisition of property pursuant 
to the option will not be a taxable event. At the time of sale, the recipient will receive 
capital gain or loss treatment pursuant to the usual capital gain rules. 
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viduals holding less than five per cent of the total combined voting 
power or value of all stock of the corporation,86 and in many closely 
held corporations, the majority of management personnel are also 
major stockholders. The qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock 
bonus plans offer some help, but the closely held corporation may 
have difficulty funding these plans.87 The best remaining avenue 
for achieving their goals of compensating and keeping management 
talent may well be through the provisions of section 83(b), which 
will enable the corporation to transfer property conditioned on fu-
ture employment to executives, and to have the executives elect to 
include this income in the year of receipt. This would provide both 
substantial security for the corporation in regard to continuity of 
management and potential capital gains treatment for the employee 
on future appreciation. On the other hand, employees may find this 
approach undesirable since they run the risk of forfeiture and can-
not use the stock to meet their immediate tax obligation. 
86. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(7). The 5% limitation applies to corporations 
having more than $2,000,000 of equity capital; for smaller corporations the percentage 
limitation varies with equity, but the maximum permissible ownership is 10%, Quali-
fied stock option plans would seem to be of greatest advantage to the large publicly-
held corporations, in which stock ownership is widely dispersed. Its utility for the 
closely held corporation would not seem to be that great, as the e.xecutives will often 
exceed the 5% holdings limit in the case of corporations having more than $2,000,000 
in equity capital, or the additional percentage allowed if there is less than $2,000,000 
in equity capital. 
87. INT, REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 401(a), 40l(d). 
